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IanM





Joined: 28 Jan 2009
Posts: 254
Reputation: 101.1
votes: 7
Location: The centre of the universe

PostPosted: Mon Jan 18, 2010 1:09 pm    Post subject: Haiti and our Military, why Real Life is the best training. Reply with quote

Real life is the best training there is. Now, what is happening in Haiti is quite horrible, however we do need to have a presence there for a long time, we do have the opportunity to bring some good out of it all. Over the long term we can build their infrastructure back up and hopefully over the long game improve their quality of life.

We also have the opportunity to practice things, and develop our military out of it.

Simply put, real life is the best training there is. We do need to work on the whole three block war concept, and we've done the high intensity and low intensity operations, now we need to practice and develop nation building, and look at it all in a new sense, we can develop methodologies, and train troops so we can take these lessons to Afghanistan and further their development.

We need more troops on the ground, and with the current state of the regular force, we need to tap into the Reserve Forces, both to train them, as well as train staffs and develop new techniques for dealing with failed states in reconstruction.

First off, I look at it, and wonder how we can do it.

Well, I think we need to call out the Reserve force. I think that it can be a good idea to start making Haiti a reserve deployment only.

I would look at 4-6 month rotations for at least 2 years. The reserves can use the training and experience, as well as they are trained to work in a light role, vice a mechanized role, as well as freeing up Regular forces to deal with high intensity operations.

If I could, I would start with Land Forces Atlantic Area and Joint Task Force Atlantic, they are the best positioned right now to assist.

If I could, I would form a composite battlegroup out of the units as follows;

36 CBG -

36 CBG HQ - Liason Officer Parties as well as Some command staff. Provide administration and public affairs support from personnel assigned to Brigade Headquarters.
1 NSH - 1x Infantry Platoon for Defense and Security. Organic Transport for this platoon from unit stores. Provide Storemen and command staff.
2 NSH - 1x Infantry Platoon for Defense and Security. Organic Transport for this platoon from unit stores. Provide Storemen and command staff.
WNSR - 1x Infantry Platoon for Defense and Security. Organic Transport for this platoon from unit stores. Provide Storemen and command staff.
PLF - 1x Infantry Platoon for Defense and Security. Organic Transport for this platoon from unit stores. Provide Storemen and command staff.

Now, I would of course use the standard infantry platoon layout, however I would assign 2x Milcot, 2x LSVW and 2x MLVW for troop transport, as well as 2x LSVW for platoon stores, as I would of course load them out. The 4x infantry platoons would have to come under a company headquarters, which would have to be provided from one of the Units, the CQ Staff and other headquarters staff would have to be a composite effort.

35 Service Battalion - Provide first line maintenance for the composite infantry company, as well as first line combat support directly assigned - Kitchen, Supply, transport. As well as provide officers and specialists to control logistics, ideally in addition to detachments assigned to the infantry platoon, then they should also provide individual augmentees and equipment to form a battlegroup Forward supply group.

33 Service Battalion - Form a composite logistics group with battle group maintenance, supply as well as much transport as possible.

45 Field Engineering Squadron - Provide 1x Engineering troop with organic transport, provide Engineer Recce Parties as well as bridging and heavy engineer equipment.

1 Field Regiment / 84 Independant Battery - Provide some transport elements for battlegroup headquarters as well as the logistics forward support group. As well as some administrative staff. Provide augmentees to form a headquarters defense and security platoon.

Prince Edward Island Regiment - 1x Recce troop in LUVW for route recce, as well as some command staff.

37 CBG -

37 CBG HQ - Liason Officer Parties, as well as some command staff. Provide administration and public affairs suport from personnel assigned to brigade headquarters.

1 RNBR - 1x Infantry Platoon for Defense and Security. Organic Transport for this platoon from unit stores. Provide storemen and command staff.

2 RNBR - 1x Infantry Platoon for Defense and Security. Organic Transport for this platoon from unit stores. Provide storemen and command staff.

1 RNFLDR - 1x Infantry Platoon for Defense and Security. Organic Transport for this platoon from Land Forces Atlantic Area Training Center stocks. Provide storemen and command staff.

2 RNFLDR - 1x Infantry Platoon for Defense and Security. Organic Transport for this platoon from Land Forces Atlantic Area Training Center stocks. Provide storemen and command staff.

8 CH - 1x Recce troop in LUVW for route recce, as well as command staff.

56 Field Engineering Squadron - 1x Engineering troop, transport and equipment to be provided from Canadian School of Military Engineering at Gagetwon, provide engineer recce parties as well as command staff.


37 CBG Service Battalions - Provide transport, equipment and personnel to form out the logistics forward support group, as well as provide first line combat support to other units.

37 CBG Artillery Units - Provide augmentees for a defense and security unit.

LFAATC - Provide equipment and vehicles, including stores from LFAATC stores at Camp Gagetown and Camp Aldershot. Provide some individual augmentees.


4 Health Services Group - Provide first line medical support units from Reserve Field Ambulances in the Atlantic Area, as well as organic medical support.

4 Operational Support Group - Provide Battlegroup Headquarters and Signals drawn from reserve signals units throughout the Atlantic Area. Provide line detachments for internal communiciations, as well as for maintenance and repair of local telecommuniciations infrastucture. Provide first line tactical signals support to units, including the provisioning of signals detachments, radio rebroadcast detachments as well as national communiciations via satellite and high frequency communiciations. Ideally the battlegroup headquarters would be at least 1x radio troop, 2x national communiciations detachments, 2-4x radio rebroadcast detachments,

3 Intelligence Company (LFAA Unit ) - Provide intelligence support to Battlegroup Headquarters. Provide dismounted intelligence detachments.

LFAA psyops unit - Provide first line psychological warfare detachments in order to assist with operations.

LFAA Civil Military Co-operation unit. Equipment to be provided by LFAATC. Activate this unit and use them well for their role, its vitally important.

4 Engineer Support Regiment (Regular) - Provide 1x Construction Engineer troop, as well as supplies and specialist engineering support. Look at providing a field troop for camp construction tasks.

HMCS Scotian - Provide port security units, as well as equipment including assault boats and other waterborne units. This should be used to help security and assist with port security in conjunction with other nations. As well as look at deployment of Traffic Control units.

30 MP Company - Provide Military police detachments for use with the deployed battle group. Attempt to form a full Military Police Platoon for operations, if unable, look at drawing from other personnel from 3 Military Police Company in Gagetown.

LFAA HQ - Provide specialist personnel, as well as command and control of the operation from Canada. Provide JAG support.


So, the proposed deployment would look as follows;

Infantry Company +
Infantry Company +
Medical Company
Forward Support Company +
Engineer Squadron -
Recce Squadron -
Battlegroup HQ + Signals
Defense and Security Platoon
Military Police Platoon

This would be the composite contribution ideally to the effort. This would provide around 600-800 trained personnel. I am sure there would be no shortage of volenteers. I would recommend that they deploy for 3-6 months, ideally 6 months. I can see recovery efforts in Haiti streching out into the years.

So why LFAA first? Well, simply put, they have the troops, they have the equipment, as well as they have the location to begin bulk shipments by sea. Air transport simply is not going to cut it, it is too expensive and too piecemeal. All of the equipment is located between 4-6 hours from a major port, which means it can be shipped down once the exact requirements for the assets are determined and before personnel and command arrangements are determined. I have done a rough estimate of the vehicles required;

Infantry Company ;

1x Milcot (OC Rover)
1x Milcot (2IC Rover)
1x LSVW- CP (Coy CP)
1x MLVW (Stores)
1x MLVW (Stores)
1x MLVW (Stores)
1x LSVW (Stores)
1x LSVW (Baggage)
1x Milcot (CQMS Rover)
4x Milcot (Pl Comd Rover)
8x LSVW (Pl Transport / 2 per Platoon)
4x MLVW (Pl Transport / 2 per Platoon)
2x LSVW MRT (First line maintenance)
1x LSVW AMB (First line medical support)

Forward Support Company

Supply Platoon

2x HLVW (Stores)
2x MVLW (Stores)
4x HLVW (Fuel)
4x LSVW (Stores)
2x Milcot (Pl Comd / Pl WO Rover)

Transport Platoon

8x HLVW
8x MLVW
2x Milcot (Pl Comd / Pl WO Rover)

Maintenance Platoon

2x Milcot (Pl Comd / Pl WO Rover)
6x LSVW MRT (Maintenance Support)
4x LSVW Cargo (Maintenance Stores)

Logistics Operations / Company HQ

2x Milcot (OC / 2IC Rover)
2x LSVW CP (Log Ops CP)
1x LSVW Cargo (Baggage)
1x MLVW (Stores)
1x MLVW (Stores)
1x Milcot (CQMS Rover)

Recce Squadron

Recce Troop x 2
8x GWagen Ea for recce detachments and patrols.

Squadron HQ
1x Milcot (OC Rover)
1x Milcot (2IC Rover)
1x LSVW- CP (Coy CP)
1x MLVW (Stores)
1x MLVW (Stores / Fuel)
1x MLVW (Stores / Fuel)
1x LSVW (Stores)
1x LSVW (Baggage)
1x Milcot (CQMS Rover)
4x Milcot (Pl Comd Rover)

Engineer Squadron

Squadron HQ

1x Milcot (OC Rover)
1x Milcot (2IC Rover)
1x LSVW- CP (Coy CP)
1x MLVW (Stores)
1x MLVW (Stores)
1x MLVW (Stores)
1x LSVW (Stores)
1x LSVW (Baggage)
1x Milcot (CQMS Rover)

Field Troop x2
1x Milcot (Pl Comd Rover)
1x Milcot (Engineer Recce Party)
2x MLVW (Cargo / Stores)
4x LSVW (Platoon Transport)

Construction Engineering Troop
I don't know really how these are structures, and they have lots of specialised equipment, so its difficult to determine exactly what is required. I'll have to double check all my reference material.

1x Milcot (Pl Comd Rover)
1x Milcot (Engineer Recce Party)
2x MLVW (Cargo / Stores)
4x LSVW (Platoon Transport)

Medical Company

Company HQ
1x Milcot (OC Rover)
1x Milcot (2IC Rover)
1x LSVW- CP (Coy CP)
1x MLVW (Stores)
1x MLVW (Stores)
1x MLVW (Stores)
1x LSVW (Stores)
1x LSVW (Baggage)
1x Milcot (CQMS Rover)

UMS Section;
2x MLVW Medical variant
2x MVLW Cargo Variant
1x MLVW Dental Variant
4x LSVW Ambulance
4x LSVW Cargo (Medical Stores)
1x Milcot (Rover)

Ambulance Platoon;
6x LSVW Ambulance
1x Milcot (Rover)


Battlegroup Headquarters and Signals

Battlegroup Staff;

8x Milcot (Liason Parties)
2x LSVW Cargo (Bde Staff transport)
2x MLVW Cargo (Bde Staff transport)
2x MLVW Cargo (Bde Staff Baggage)
4x Milcot (Intelligence Element)
8x Milcot (CIMIC detachments)


Tactical HQ;
1x LSVW Cargo (Defense Party)
2x LUVW (G-Wagen) (Commander's rover and tactical party.)

Radio Troop;
1x LSVW CP (G3 CP)
1x LSVW CP (G3 Step up CP)
1x LSVW CP (G4 CP)
1x LSVW CP (G4 Step up CP)
1x LSVW CP (Sig Ops)
1x LSVW CP (G6 Alt CP)
1x LSVW CP (CIMIC CP)
1x LSVW CP (G2 CP)
1x Milcot (Troop Comd Rover)
2x NCCIS-LT Detachment (Rear Link)
2x HF Detachments (HF Comms)

Access Troop
6x Milcot (Signals Dispatch Service / Dispatch Runners.)
6x Line Detachments (Line detachments.)
1x Milcot (Troop Comd Rover)
2x MLVW CP (Network / Data Network)

Support Troop
1x Milcot (Tp Comd Rover)
2x LSVW (Cargo)
Radio and Signal First line Maintenance detachments as needed.

Defense and Security Platoon
1x Milcot (Pl Comd Rover)
2x LSVW (Platoon Transport)
2x MVLW (Platoon Transport)

Squadron HQ
1x Milcot (OC Rover)
1x Milcot (2IC Rover)
1x LSVW- CP (Coy CP)
2x MLVW (Stores)
2x MLVW (Stores)
1x MLVW (Stores)
1x LSVW (Stores)
2x LSVW (Baggage)
1x Milcot (CQMS Rover)
1x LSVW Ambulance (First line medical support)
2x LSVW MRT (First line maintenance support)

So, why identify the vehicles first? Easy, once they can be tasked, they can be marshalled and loaded aboard a ship, I think a charter would work best here. After they set out, then personnel can be assembled in Halifax, or wherever, formed out into formed units, kitted out, go through departure over a few days, and hopefully arrive at the same time as the ship with their vehicles and most of their equipment. I would of course deploy an advance party down to help set up. I would recommend that it would be an Infantry Section, Brigade Recce Parties as well as some advance signals so they can be air lifted with little consequence.

Now, what happens on the ground. Well, this is over the long haul. As everyone knows, there is considerable unrest and a near break down of order. I recommend that first off, a base camp be established and an area of operations developed. Once the forces are in situation, they should begin to liase with aid agencies, and use their facilities to help develop a command and control system to prevent duplication of effort. Within the are of operations, considerable effort should be begin to first off maintain camp security, possibly a co-location of aid groups with the military contribution. This simplifies security in the beginning. As well, the priority should then be route clearance to both the airport, as well as the sea port. If possible, perhaps airfield engineers can be deployed to start construction heliocopter landing zones and possibly an airfield.

Once there is a presence in the area, the next thought has to go past the immediate needs of the people, as I think it would take two to four weeks for this group to fall into place. All aid convoys should have an escort if needed, which gives our troops vital training in convoy protection. I would also recommend that engineer recce and construction engineer parties, as well as signals personnel go out and start trying to rebuild infrastucture as best as they can. We must of course act in conjunction with the civil authorities however, and maintain law and order. Medical personnel should be dual tasked to provide medical support to units, as well as to help provide medical care and clinics. Considerable stocks of supplies should be shipped in conjunction with the group, including rations, water purification equipment, generators, tentage, medical supplies.

As the initial work commences, security of aid suppplies will be vital, and all NGO and governmental aid should be held in protective depots, which is why the infantry heavy contribution, ideally this would all be co-located, in order to provide the greatest economies.

Within a week of arriving on the ground, there should be with working in conjunction of local authorities, as well as other NGOs, some sort of plan to alleviate suffering and restore order as well as their way of life. One thing that may have to happen is that we may need to look at building and providing a refugee camp within whatever area of operations there is. We may need to airlift more supplies, including kitchen trailers, tentage, cots, and all of that. That doesn't really take up much space, however we do need to provide as well medical, spiritual and other support. All supplies should be moving by ship, and should be moved on a push system vice a pull system. Ideally we could easily, easily support within the confines around 1500-2500 refugees for at least 30-60 days. Possibly longer depending on NGO aid.

Now, with that set up. Engineer Recce parties need to start doing surveys, they need to start surveying buildings and critical infrastructure. Ideally Geomantics support and Artillery Survey parties can help this. We need to adopt a comprehensive effort in order to provide a complete picture of the area. Intelligence support is vital here, as they can collate the information and provide reasoned and rational analysis of the situation on the ground, that is also the reason for the recce assets. As information keeps coming in, and a better picture is determined, more specialised requests can be given for assets, stores and aid.We can then work on building and implimenting a plan of action.

The battle groups' mission should be as follows;

1 - Provide defense and security to aid agencies, and provide support to civil order.
2 - Provide route clearance and engineering survey assets.
3 - Provide command control and coordination to Non governmental organizations, as well as develop an effective control system for aid efforts within the area of operation.
4 - Provide some limited medical support directly to affected refugees and civilians, possibly as well as providing food and water.
5 - Begin repairs of critical infrastructure and communiciations.
6 - Provide liason parties and civil military affairs personnel to help with reconstruction.
7 - Ensure public order.
8 - Directly provide aid and construction support as needed, including possibly the rebuilding of schools and other government infrastructure.
9 - Restore confidence in the civil government and attempt to improve morale.

The first three are easy, the last six are difficult. As the situation stabilizes, it may be possible to employ infantry troops in a general duties and construction role. However that will be done over time. I think more augmentees may be requested as time goes on. I think that there should be a look at forming more engineer and reconstruction assets within 30-60 days. This would again be from reservists, however their role would be 90 day tours in company strength. I would recommend possibly two such companies on the ground at any given time. They would be at a company - strength though, and their role would be essentially working on reconstruction. Their orbat would be much more flexibile, although on infantry lines.

Company HQ
Tac HQ
Command Post
Company Quarter Master
CIMIC Detachment

Platoon x3
Platoon HQ
3x Section

These would be all trades, and would be used to subdivide the area out. They would be armed yes, and motorized with each section having a vehicle, while the Company HQ would be quite similar to what is listed earlier. I would recommend that these groups also have additional combat service support assets. It is quite possible that each group, could operate an additional refugee camp, or provide simple clean up and construction support to allow restoration of the due functioning of society. Simple yes?

So, after 6 months, another area takes over, say SQFT or LFQA (Quebec), and they continune the mission. However, as the situation stablizies, I think we can see the draw down of resources and personnel to a smaller level really. I would recommend that vehicles be left in theater, and replaced from other stocks, simply to save time and effort in shipping them down .

Now then, the why. Why all of it, it seems rather useless and out of touch. Quite simple. We don't know how to nation build, or rebuild after a major disaster really. We need to train our troops, as well as develop our lessons long before it happens here. I'm talking of course of the whole worry about British Columbia and an earthquake. We need to look at how this will all work in the reconstruction phase of a disaster, we also need to start building a rapport with aid agencies, and figuring out how it all works. We do have the disaster assistance repsonse team, however they are not designed to settle in there for the long haul. Rather, they are only for the first 90 days.

I see the role of the military in this first to provide security as well as co-ordination, and then to really move in with some limited aid as well, not to mention specialized aid, before taking more and more of an effort in reconstruction. The NGOs must work together, they must be able to assist us in this mission, otherwise it all falls apart really. We can develop a way of getting it done better, and help our stature on the world level.

It really goes into my arguements for civil defense and the need for it. We have an opportunity here to help develop lessons, strategies and develop our troops, plus we can give employment to a lot of reservists, everybody likes money right? They can't really spend it down there, but they can when we get home, so its a net gain right there left wing people? More so than that, we do have a duty to help reconstruct Haiti, and help bring it into the present day. I mean its just an idea. I've taken a lot of lessons from reading up on civil defense and emergency prepardness, and I can see many roles for the military as well, from emergency feeding, to emergency shelter. However the priority is of course to restore order, improve public confidence and help systematically rebuild the area. We cannot do it all in Haiti, but we can hopefully take an area and help rebuild that.

Within the context of international command and control. We should trial this concept for future disasters, by dividing the country into regions, and developing a command and control structure, we can help focus efforts on rebuilding, not the immediate, but the rebuilding, which takes much longer. It will prevent duplication of effort, and it will provent a waste of material. Hopefully as well, the presence of the military will make it such that is harder for aid supplies to simply vanish or be misallocated.

Just a thought, comments?
IanM





Joined: 28 Jan 2009
Posts: 254
Reputation: 101.1
votes: 7
Location: The centre of the universe

PostPosted: Tue Jan 19, 2010 11:41 am    Post subject: Part two, looking at it all. Reply with quote

One thing, is that I do not want a return to the 'snakes and ladders' days of the reserve forces. I really think that is not the role of the military and or the reserve forces to be employed in heavy urban SAR. Again, that should be produced by other agencies. However, aid to civil power is a military role, as is furthering reconstruction efforts in countries. Not to mention, the idea that the reserve force is there as an equal partner in regards to the regular force makes me consider this idea.

My idea of using the reserve force is such that there is really a need for them to take more of a hand in lower intensity operations. There is plenty of valuable and relevant training to be considered, especially since most of the area is urban, and similar to theaters of operation we currently deploy into. Now, I think that with that being said, it looks as if it could be an excellent way to develop effective command and staff skills in order to help rebuild the reserve force and provide effort. My goal is not to have the reserve transformed over to a heavy search and rescue force, rather they provide an armed and skilled backdrop for the regular forces.

A lot of the tasks that have to be done are similar to a theater of operations, and will provide effective training to the reserve forces in any level of trade. For example, convoy security, medical care, base defense, forward resupply, actual battlegroup communiciations, and the staff work that plays along with it all. So really it is a win, win.

Expounding upon this idea though, the use of reserve battlegroups for low intensity operations. I think that should the concept be trialed, and ultimately be successful, I think that with a small increase of budget, and a small increase of equipment, that we must seriously look at the concept.

I would recommend the standing up, equipment wise of four reserve battle groups (1 per area). That would of course be equipped and ready to deploy at short notice, or for standard operational tours as augmented staff.

I would centralize the equipment at Area Training Centers, however separate from the Area Pool Fleet. This equipment would consist of the following;

All vehicles required for the force.
Sufficient weapons for all personnel, plus spares.
Sufficient radio and communications equipment for the force.
30 Days of combat supplies in pallets, including rations, ammunition, combat stores and general stores.
30 Days of fuel in bulk holdings.
30 Days of emergency medical supplies and combat medical supplies.
Water Purification, as well as portable electric power generation.
All other general and technical stores required for 30 days of sustained operations.


All of this equipment, must be held separately, and not used unless the unit is activated. This serves two purposes. 1 - It prevents poaching of equipment to fill other requirements - especially weapons and radio equipment. 2 - It also prevents wear and tear of the equipment. 3 - It provides a reserve of stores in case of a local emergency or domestic operations. Should this happen though, all equipment must be acquired, we cannot just go and pull or allocate equipment from other reserve units, it simply affects the requirements of the units to provide training and support too much. Even the buildings should be constructed. I would recommend underground storage, in climate controlled facilities in order to make sure that the stock is alright.

To administer this stock pile, a mobilization cell must be activated. This would require no more than 20-50 personnel, which should be provided by reserve soldiers on tasking. There must also be a dedicated planning cell of 10-20 personnel, also provided by reserve soldiers on tasking.
I would recommend the following;

Planning Cell - 2-3 Year Class B Contract.
Plans Officer - Major - Combat Arms
A / Plans Officer - Capt - Combat Arms
A / Plans Officer (Logistics) - Capt - CSS
A / Plans Officer (Training ) - Capt - Any
A / Plans Officer (Signals) - Capt - Signals
Plans Warrant Officer - MWO - Combat Arms
A / Plans Warrant Officer - WO - Combat Arms
A / Plans Warrant Officer (Logistics)- WO - CSS
A / Plans Warrant Officer (Training) - WO - Any
A / Plans Warrant Officer (Signals) - WO - Signals
Intelligence Officer - Lieutenant / Captain - Int
Intelligence Operator - Sergeant - Int
Movements Officer - Captain - Logistics
Movement Controller - Sergeant - Logistics
Air liaison Officer - Captain - Air Force
Naval liaison Officer - Lieutenant (N) - Navy
Clerk - Corporal - RMS Clerk
Clerk - Corporal - RMS Clerk


The planning cell would be responsible for developing plans and doctrine for the force, as well as maintaining contingency plans in conjunction with other commands for deployment. They would work in conjunction with the mobilization cell to activate the force, as well as provide staff analysis of any situation, and provide initial orders in conjunction with the controlling area. This may work as part of the J3 Cell of a JTF or LFA Headquarters, or may work separately, reporting to the JTF / LFA commander. One big thing, is that it is a staff ex cerise. It must be voluminous in nature. A huge amount of the officers are junior officers for a reason, they are that to give them valuable staff experience, due to the fact I cannot see a constant deployment of forces. By constantly producing new operations plans, new orders, developing lessons learned, it will help improve our military. They must also work with the various OPIs to ensure that they have a training system, and a readiness system in place.

I look at these sort of battle groups, we'll call them Reserve Battle groups, as another mouth for the individual reserve force system to feed. We already have domestic operations companies and immediate response units for reserve forces to staff, however this is a separate idea, since they will be operating domestically, within the frame work of their own units. In a domestic situation, the stores, supplies and stockpiles will be excellent to use in case of emergency.

Also, seeing as units do have their own organic transport, weapons and stores. What does this pool provide? It provides on the ground equipment ready for any fly in forces. Consider, Ontario has a major disaster, so Land forces Central Area provides activated reservists as well as troops from 2 CMBG. However more troops are required for whatever reason. So Land Forces Western Area, or Land Forces Quebec Area activates its battle group, rather than move all the equipment from their stocks, which we'll say are at Valcartier, rather they fly to Petawawa the troops themselves, having simply marshaled in Valcartier, go down to the stocks, unlock the gates and load the equipment and go. Providing a much needed boost to troops already in play.


Everybody wins, but its an expensive proposition, well not overly so. I am looking at around 500 positions to be filled by Class B contracts nationally, with roughly 1-2 billion dollars worth of equipment and supplies. (I haven't done the math out on it yet). Some of the equipment can simply be purchased by increasing current procurement program mes, and buying additional equipment to kit out the battle group, with an additional 10% held at a national level as replacements as reserves. Other equipment will have to be bought anew, some of which we cannot get anymore. With that, all I can do is recommend that it be rolled in if possible to the current procurement plans for replacement, failing that, COTS and other small scale procurement should be done. As long as it is under, 100 million? I believe Department of National Defense does not have to go through the treasury board for approval of spending, thus less IRBs and politicalization. With current operations, we have also used the Urgent Operational Requirement to bypass current spending and testing.

Now, again, this is a reserve thing, so its going to be light troops, we're not looking at buying a new fleet of armoured vehicles for them, rather more of their current equipment and replacement current equipment. The net impact after initial purchases will be low, should the vehicles and equipment be stored properly. With that, of course, there is an O and M cost, as well as the cost of construction, however it should not be that high.

The long term operating cost on the estimates of the department of national defense are low. Most operational expenses are not occurred within the defense department budget, rather from the consolidated revenue fund. Now, with that as well, it can also be politically expedient. I do of course, as always recommend we practice environmentalism, if for no other reason that we need to keep the environmentalists happy. I recommend any buildings and construction for them well be off grid, using solar power or wind power or all of that, and that it is built to very exacting environmental specifications. Its good optics, you know? Good optics are important. Makes a billion or two billion dollar increase to the defense department budget look easier to swallow. We would need an establishment change of around +500 positions for the personnel on contract to sustained this.

The big focus I want to make clear, is that it cannot be rob peter to pay paul. It just cannot be that way, or the whole concept falls by the wayside. There needs to be new equipment provided, there needs to new positions established for the full time administration, there needs to be new facilities, and there needs to be no drawing from this outside of activation. Its a hard pill to swallow, however it does save money in the long haul.

Simply put, as equipment gets replaced, over time, we will have a stockpile, or we will be able to pass down to lower priority equipment, or use stocks that are replaced to maintain other stocks. For example, if we buy a replacement 5 tonne truck, and 20 years later, they are falling apart and slowly being replaced, we have a stock of trucks to replace from over time, thus reducing O and M costs over the long haul, as new systems come online.

Now, how to staff it really, that is the hard part. Land Forces Reserve Restructure was the last expansion of the reserves. I would recommend actually an expansion of positions within the reserve force. The manning of this is the huge problem. It is the problem with any reserve force, and it affects it for many ways.

The army is stretched thin, thinner than we think. Thus, we need more positions, however the problem is, we can't maintain the training system, as well as the field force. I posted above about the idea of providing 1x platoon essentially from each reserve unit. The problem is, it would decimate them from the time that it was deployed, until after its return. You would have all the keen troops go in, all the ones who are vital to the reserve force success. These would not be able to be used as augmenters to regular force deployments, or to schools or other positions that arise. So essentially you eat your seed corn.

Essentially, I think you would need to enlarge the reserve force by 20-30%. This means more costs for equipment, training, etc. There is also the additional strain placed upon schools, as it takes 3-4 years to develop junior leadership and 4-10 years to develop mid level leadership, and 10-20 years to develop high level leadership. I thus, seriously recommend that each reserve unit be given an additional 30 positions to be filled, as I have stated before. 30 positions will open up those slots, and allow for reserve units to grow first off, provide better training, provide more to be used across the board. This is not something that happens over night. First off, some reserve units struggle to maintain their manning levels, that is a separate issue, the other issue is the time and strain that it would take to train them. Thus, I seriously recommend that it be done in stages.

Reserve units who are near their manning cap get the 30 positions, consisting of 3 Officer Positions, 2 Military Manning Overfill, and 25 standard positions immediately. The Military Manning Overfill could be traded or used by the unit in any way possible. They also must be funded for those additional 37.5 training days a year, and associated overhead costs as needed. That would be year one. Year two, we would see another set of units get 15 positions. 3 Officer, 2 Military Manning Overfill and 10 positions. Year Three, a third set gets 15 positions, this would be the remaining positions. Years four and five, the remaining units get the last 15 positions to bring it up to the thirty positions. By this point, hopefully, all things considered, there is not an overly large impact to the training system, that the people allocated in years 1-2-3 are progressing into junior leadership, and we can expand hopefully in year 6-7 to 40 new positions total per unit, to allow for a full sub-sub unit (Platoon esque) per unit, as well as some associated positions.

With that being said, retention is the key, and its looking at a huge associated increase in cost. Essentially each unit would have funding for a mission element plus, as well as all the additional overhead. Some cost savings can be accumulated by rationalization, and economies through the system, however it will cost money. It will probably cost a lot of money, however the net benefit will be great. No matter what, those additional bodies are employable through the system, and if implemented should after the initial shock to the training system, be able to be employed within that system, or employed supporting the regular forces.

Now, of course, this only gives a lump of bodies. How they would be employed is of a huge consideration. First off, short notice deployments. This will be hard, very hard to do, simply because of a lack of job protection to the reservist, as well as the associated factors with short notice. Mobilization would be difficult at best, should a system not be put into place. I think that personnel should be identified, and screened in advance. Those who want to volenteer, should of course volenteer, however a short notice deployment must be worked in advance with their school, and or employer. As we could be looking at with a Haiti Situation, a week's at best notice to move for 90-180 days, plus post tour of say 30-60 days. It is a difficult concept, however I think enough volenteers could come forward.

With the idea of a low intensity battle group, I can see it working as follows. The first rotation to a low intensity conflict would be the regular forces. The second rotation, would be identified and go through the standard pre-deployment training and 6 month operational tour. The third and continuation would also go through that. With that of course being said, it will be far easier to get volunteers. With the additional positions, assuming that they are full, we would be not draining reserve units entirely of their staff and troops.

However, there is much more to it than all really.
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